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Coastline Crisis
Today, one of the major problems facing the State of California
is the preservation of its coastal resources. The author reviews
contemporary examples of unchecked private and governmental
development of the California coastal area and discusses instances
where development has been in derogation of public access to
California beaches. It is the author's contention that state policy
expressed in the state constitution and statutes, guarantees to the
citizenry a right of access to beaches. In the face of reckless de-
velopment of the state's coastal resources, tighter use restrictions
are imperative. Finally, the author directs his attention toward a
brief analysis of attempted but unsuccessful legislation introduced
in the California Assembly during the 1970 Regular Session.
The State of California's priceless coastline and estuary systems are
in trouble; they are being mismanaged, misused and degraded. While
some progress has been attempted in recent years,' the State of Cali-
fornia lacks an effective system for managing its coast, bays and es-
tuaries. Efforts are being made by the legislature to solve the prob-
lem.' But, meanwhile, these natural resources, which are of great value
to the general public, remain in a state of siege. Private interests and
even governmental agencies are demanding that such resources be
dredged and filled and built upon to make profits, to promote industry
and expand the tax base, and to accommodate a population that is
growing and shifting to suburban areas surrounding the large cities.'
According to one report, the California coastline covers a total of
1,272 miles.4 Of this total mileage, public ownership encompasses ap-
proximately 249 miles. This portion is further reduced to a figure of
149 miles for actual use for public recreation. The remaining 100 miles
1 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8800: (CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1642, § 1, p. 3934).
... to be the policy of the State of California to develop, encourage, and
maintain a comprehensive, coordinated state plan for the orderly, long-range
conservation and development of marine and coastal resources which will in-
sure their wise multiple use in the total public interest.
2 S.B. 371, A.B. 2131, A.B. 730, A.B. 640, 1970 Regular Session.
3 Sacramento Union, Sept. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
4 OUTrooR RECREATION REsouRcEs REviEw COMMIsSION, REPORT 4 (1962).
TYPE OWNERSHIP
Beach Bluff Marsh Public Restricted Private
(miles)
283 883 106 149 100 1023
1971 / Coastline Crisis
is restricted for military use and other governmental functions prohibit-
ing public usage.
Based on official 1960 census figures,5 there are approximately
100,000 people in the state for each 1 mile of publicly owned coast-
line. The situation is compounded by the fact that most Californians
live within easy commuting distance of the coast.0 There are predic-
tions that the Los Angeles-San Francisco region, by the year 2000, will
become a vast megalopolis some 600 miles in length with a population
of 44.5 million personsT
The problem thus becomes one of developing a solution to protect
the ecology of the coastline and the public's interest in access to the
beach areas from such an anticipated massive impact of development
and population density. It should be readily apparent that vast owner-
ship of the coastline by private interests will eventually result in de-
velopments of one type or another which will effectively restrict public
access to the beach areas.' The need for protection of the public in-
terest in the coastline is best summarized by Dr. Norman K. Sanders:
Socially, the beaches serve a very important function in Cali-
fornia society. The coast is the only convenient place left where
city dwellers can get away from the pollution and tension of pres-
ent urban conditions. If this safety valve is made inaccessible, the
urban crises could become critical.9
Coastal Development Propensities of Private Owners
Continued influx of population density to the coastal areas has
brought about a rise in dollar value of available building sites.10 The
logical result has been an increase in property tax which has forced
5 BUREAU OF THE CENsuS: U.S. POPULATION (Official Census), 1890-1960.
Total population of California in 1960 was 15,717,204. The preliminary count for
the 1970 census showed California with a population of 19,696,840. (Sacramento
Union, Sept. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 2).
6 In California alone over 13 million people now live within a one hour drive
of the ocean. By 1980 this population will increase to 20 million. Commission on
Ocean Resources, Resources Agency of California, CALIFORNIA AND THE OCEAN, 161
(1966).
7 CONSERVATION FOUNDATION: A REPORT ON ENVmONMENTAL ISSUES, (May
1970).
8 A.B. 2090, as introduced during the 1969 Regular Session, originally included
the following declaration:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that . . . 90 percent of California's
population lives on 8 percent of the land area, largely concentrated in metro-
politan areas in the coastal zone, and this concentration is increasing; that
access to the shoreline is diminishing with respect to the increasing popula-
tion; and that approximately 60 percent of the shoreline held in private own-
ership, and much of the publicly owned shoreline, is subject to development
inconsistent with the highest public interest.
9 Dr. Norman K. Sanders, California's Coastline . . . The Shattered Resource,
prepared for Senate Natural Resources Committee Hearing, (Jan. 1969).
10 See note 6 supra.
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some owners to dispose of their properties for development purposes
while others have undertaken development plans of their own.
Private development in the 70's will increasingly be carried on
by organizations that treat land development as only one of a va-
riety of investments. Major industrial organizations will be invest-
ing heavily in real estate. The reasons are readily apparent:
Land has traditionally been a hedge against inflationary periods.
More importantly, many concerns manufacturing consumer prod-
ucts see land development as a synergistic operation which will
help to merchandise other goods or services provided by the indus-
try. . . . What can be expected (is) a major invasion of the real
estate field by companies who 10 years ago had no interest at all
These organizations have vast resources. Unlike many smaller
developers, they can sweat out the customary delays put forward
by municipal bodies to discourage development they do not favor.
Secondly, these developers will usually be talking about very large
tracts of land and very significant developments. They will be in-
terested in special concessions and will, in effect, want local regu-
lation to be cut to favor the pattern of their development."'
Some such developments are far beyond the planning stages, as evi-
denced by the progress of Castle & Cooke's "Sea Ranch" in Sonoma
county and American-Standard's development on the Santa Cruz coast-
line. Both of these corporate enterprises were able to function exactly
as described above.
The "Sea Ranch" development was held up for a period of time due
to a zoning ordinance requiring the developer to establish public access
to the beach. Since this requirement was not in the best interest of the
developer, Castle & Cooke was able to "wait-it-out" while the regulation
was modified, allowing it to eventually file its subdivision plan without
providing any access to the water for the general public. The result,
for all intents and purposes, is private beach frontage for the residents
of "Sea Ranch." A continuation of this type of policy would eventually
mean no public access to coastal beaches without subjecting the public
to prosecution for trespass 12 on the privately owned upland property. 13
However, the specific problem of access through future subdivisions
11 Babcock, Regulatory Devices, AMEmCAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS
(1969).
12 CAL. PEN. CODE § 602(k).
13- CAL. CIV. CODE § 830:
Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different
intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tide water, takes to ordi-
nary high-water mark....
"Upland" in this Note refers to coastal property bordering on the beach. It extends
landward from the vegetation line or other natural boundary of the dry-sand beach.
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has been approached by the enactment of Chapter 1308 in the 1970
legislative session. The addition of section 11610.5 to the Business
and Professions Code provides that no city or county shall approve
a subdivision map without a provision for "reasonable public access"
to the shoreline, unless reasonable access is otherwise available.
American-Standard Corporation, a large manufacturer of plumbing
supplies, has undertaken a substantial development near the city of
Santa Cruz. The development has a dual corporate purpose: profits
from the sale of manufactured lots to builders and a ready market for
the corporation's primary products installed in the new construction.
As further evidence of corporate ability to gain concessions from af-
fected municipalities, American-Standard was able to have its outlying
development annexed to the city of Santa Cruz. The subsequent con-
figuration is based on the "dumb-bell"' 4 principle, because the required
number of other private land owners did not favor annexation at the
present time. The final result is generally considered as poor urban
planning. 15
Private Interest Influence and Governmental Cooperation
There are numerous instances of local governmental agencies dispos-
ing of coastal properties to private interests with the net result being de-
struction of the natural beauty of the area or a blocking of public access
to the shoreline. Generally, the driving force behind the municipali-
ties' action stems from an effort to increase the tax base by appealing to
industrial or commercial development in their area. Consequently,
many things are done which a regional scheme of planning would tend
to eliminate.
In the small community of Morro Bay, located in San Luis Obispo
County, a portion of bay front property was put up for sale after it had
been abandoned as an amphibian base after World War II. The osten-
sible reason given by the county Board of Supervisors was the fact that
the property was currently unproductive. The subsequent purchaser,
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., undertook the construction of a 116 million
dollar power plant. The result was two fold: the towering smoke
stacks completely dominate the landscape, all but blotting out the 576
foot high Morro Rock, a land-mark of natural beauty in the area, and
14 The "dumb-bell" principle is the method of joining an outlying area to the
existing city limits by annexing a narrow strip in between thus giving it the shape of a
bar-bell or "dumb-bell." Portland General Electric Co. v. City of Estacada, 194 Or. 145
165, 241 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1952).
15 R. BAscocm, THE ZONING GAME 122-23 (1966).
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from time to time heavy damage is caused to the surrounding residential
areas when the plant switches from natural gas consumption to burning
of fuel oil.1 6
Unfortunately, there was no basic planning to be adhered to in order
to answer the question:
[S]hould a generating plant be located on some of the most beautiful
and accessible California shoreline? If we decide that the coast
should no longer be subject to casual and random development,
then we must look insistently to the state government for an over-all
coastline use plan and laws to give it meaning."7
Perhaps one of the most telling examples of the tendency of pri-
vate enterprise and local government toward cooperative development
of the coastline is to be found in the planned development of Upper
Newport Bay in southern California.
At the start of this century, there were 28 sizable estuaries in
southern California. Three of the estuaries have disappeared and
10 others have been drastically modified. Most of the remaining
15 are either in the process of being severely changed or are sched-
uled for profound alteration. In all of California, over 60% of such
estuarine areas already have been destroyed. Upper Newport Bay
is the last major baylike body of water remaining in a fairly pris-
tine condition along 400 miles of coast between Morro Bay and
Estero de Punta Banda in Mexico.' 8
The development of Newport Bay has been of concern since the
early part of the 20th century. With increasing demands for boating,
swimming, and other recreational facilities, and the growing demand
for marina-type residential areas, the development of Upper Newport
Bay has become a critical issue in recent years. There has been a num-
ber of proposals concerning the development of the area."0 Some of
these primarily represent the needs of single-interest groups, but none,
until recently, considered more than superficially the ecological effects of
such developments on the bay. 0
The plan that appears to be favored by the Orange County Board of
Supervisors is one that involves a land exchange of county-owned water-
front property for upland property currently owned by the Irvine Com-
pany. The result would be to give entire control of the waterfront in
16 Morro Bay Sun, May 26, 1966, at 1A, Col. 1.
17 Loveridge and Yount, The Towering Stacks of Morro Bay, CRY CALIFORNIA
33 (Fall 1967).
18 CALIF. DEPT. OF FIsH AND GAME, REPORT ON NATURAL RESOURCES OF UPPER
NEWPORT BAY AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE BAY'S DEVELOPMENT 15
(Resources Agency, March 1970).
19 Id.
20 Id.
1971 / Coastline Crisis
the bay to the Irvine Company. Their proposed plan consists of de-
veloping Upper Newport Bay into a marina-residential complex with
provisions for water-oriented commercial and recreational facilities.
Deleterious effects on the living resources can be predicted if the Bay is
developed as proposed by this plan.
21
Governmental Activity in the Coastline Area
Of all state and local governmental agencies, the Division of High-
ways probably creates more havoc in the coastal areas than any other.
A prime example of such activity is reflected in the plan for a freeway
to be constructed in Santa Monica. The project consists of an earthfill
causeway of some 200 million cubic yards of dirt to be built across
Santa Monica Bay. Most of the fill, approximately 120 million cubic
yards, is to be excavated from the nearby Santa Monica Mountains. 2
Numerous engineering questions regarding the project remain unan-
swered. Can a man-made beach be constructed on the ocean side of the
new freeway? What would be the effect of the change in the current
flows in the bay itself? What effects would such a vast removal of earth
from the mountains have on the ecology of that area?
In spite of these.unanswered questions, the proponents of the plan are
anxious for it to be undertaken. Oil company geologists believe there
are oil reserves under the present site of the Santa Monica Beach State
Park. Needless to say, these interests would be concerned with the
subsequent availability of such exploration and possible exploita-
tion.
2-
Real estate developers, in turn, envision a dual wind-fall. They see
not only the possibility of creating high-rise apartments around the en-
closed water area, but also the development of a marina to enhance the
value of these apartment locations. Secondly, the removal of huge
quantities of earth fill from the mountains would create building sites
for subseqent residential developments.
24
One of the most staggering proposals of the Division of Highways is
the plan for a freeway in an area of unparalleled natural beauty, Prairie
Creek Redwoods State Park in northern California. The plan involves
Gold Bluffs Beach which was recently made a part of the park. Three
routes have been proposed: (1) through the center of the park; (2)
across the top of the cliff overlooking the ocean; or (3) right down on
21 Id.




Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2
the beach itself.25  In any of the three alternatives there will be destruc-
tion of that which was sought to be preserved initially: the enjoyment
of beauty in its natural state by people today and long into the future.
These are, assuredly, isolated incidents of coastline problems, but
they are only a small sampling of many others that have or will have the
same destructive effect. The problem, then, is one of devising some
method or procedure to deal with these problems on a state-wide basis
since present methods have led to continual erosion and piece-meal de-
struction of the coast.
Public Access to Beaches
Throughout the years there has been strong policy favoring public
ownership of shoreline areas as evidenced by Civi Code section 830.2;
That section states that absent specific language to the contrary, private
ownership of uplands ends at the high-water mark. Decisions of the
courts have interpreted this provision to create a presumption of public
ownership of land between high and low tide.2 T There is also a clearly
enunciated public policy in the California Constitution in favor of allow-
ing the public access to shoreline areas.28  Recreation is among the
"public purposes" mentioned in the constitutional provision.29  There
are numerous other legislative enactments that indicate the strong public
policy in favor of according public access to the coastline.30
One of the major problems, however, is implementing this policy for
the benefit of the citizenry. The Supreme Court of Oregon 3 1 used a
rather novel approach in protecting public access to the beach. The
25 Vladimir and Nada Kovalik, Life and Death Along the Cali/ornia Coast,
CRY CALIFORNIA 17 (Fall 1967).
26 See note 13 supra.
27 Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 103, 108 (1873); Upham v. Hosking, 62
Cal. 250, 258 (1882); Long Beach Land & Water Co. v. Richardson, 70 Cal. 206, 209
(1886); Freeman v. Bellegarde, 108 Cal. 179, 185 (1895); People v. California Fish
Co., 166 Cal. 576, 591-596 (1913); Abbott Kinney Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 53
Cal. 2d 52, 57 (1959).
28 CALIF. CONST. art. XV, § 2.
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage
or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever
it is required for any public purpose....
29 Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 752 (1951).
30 (1) CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 25 (guaranteeing the right to fish); (2) CAL.
GOV'T CODE '§§ 54090-54093 (relating to discrimination in beach access); (3) CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 39933-39937 (implementing CAL. CoNsT. art. XV, § 2 and requiring
municipalities to maintain access to navigable waters); (4) CAL. FISH & GAME CoDI3
§ 6511 and CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 6008 (restrictions on sales and leases of public
lands in Humboldt Bay in order to preserve public access); (5) CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 6210.4 (requiring the state to reserve convenient access to navigable waters in con-
nection with the sale or other disposition of shoreline lands); (6) CAL. Pun. PR.S. CODE
§ 6323 (forbidding structures on artificially accreted lands so that such accretions will
remain an unobstructed and open beach).
31 State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Oreg. 1969).
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case involved an injunction to prevent construction of a fence across
the "dry-sand" area.32 In affirming the granting of injunctive relief,
the court rejected implied dedication and prescriptive easement argu-
ments. The decision was based on the English doctrine of Custom.3
In this case, at least, it turned out to be a rather effective legal argument.
California approached the problem differently in two cases decided
in February, 1970.34 These cases involved protection of public access
across private land to the beach area itself. The court, in both in-
stances, determined that the public had acquired an easement across
private lands through application of the doctrine of implied dedica-
tion.3G In carrying out stated public policy, however, the court did
express the view that:
[F]or a fee owner to negate a finding of intent to dedicate based on
uninterrupted public use for more than five years, therefore, he
must either affirmatively prove that he has granted the public a li-
cense to use his property or demonstrate that he has made a bona
fide attempt to prevent public use.36
It appears that private upland owners may effectively prohibit any
future acquisition of public easements by making sure the test for im-
plied dedication is not met on their property. Such close guardianship
of their rights would have the affect of further reducing public access
to that area of the beach already declared to be under public ownership.
The actual public ownership is meaningless if the access is unavail-
able.
Additional Problems of Human Occupancy of the Coast
In addition to the court's attitude of attempting to enforce public
policy, the desirability of beach areas alone has prompted private own-
ers of frontage to cut off public access. The real dichotomy in the situ-
ation is that unrestricted public access to the coastline may in itself
have far reaching effects in damaging the ecology of the area. This
32 Id. at 672. "This will be assumed to be the land lying between the line of
mean high-tide and the visible line of vegetation."
33 Id.
Test for Doctrine of Custom:
(1) It must be ancient.
(2) Right must be exercised without interruption.
(3) Use must be peaceable and free from dispute.
(4) Use must be reasonable.
(5) Certainty-as to boundaries of use.
(6) Custom must be obligatory.
(7) Custom must not be repugnant or inconsistent with other customs
or laws.
34 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29 (1970). Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d
29 (1970).
35 Union Transp. Co. v. Sacramento Co., 42 Cal. 2d 235, 240 (1954).
36 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 41 (1970).
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point should be kept in mind while attempting to come up with a solu-
tion that will observe both public and private rights of ownership. 7
A large influx of the populace would involve disruption of the deli-
date environmental interaction along the coast and in waters off-shore
which follows as a result of massive human activity.38 For instance.
once the effect of a misplaced hindrance has taken place, even a suc-
cessful lawsuit may not be enough to repair the damage. A misplaced
hindrance is best described as the construction of such things as quays,
breakwaters or any other activity which has a damaging effect on the
ecology or disturbs and sometimes changes the natural flow of the cur-
rents along the coastline. Sometimes the law may refuse to recognize
the rights of the affected parties. Such was the case for the citizens of
Santa Barbara in their attempt to gain relief from oil pollution as a re-
sult of off-shore drilling.39
State's Coastal Conservation Policy
So far, the problems regarding the protection of the entire coastline,
have been expressed in a general manner by the legislature and the
people of the state.
That it is in the best interest of the state to maintain, preserve, con-
serve and otherwise continue in existence open space lands for the
production of food and fiber and to assure the use and enjoyment
of natural resources and scenic beauty for the economics and social
well-being of the State and its citizens. 40
Such an expression is nothing more than a policy statement with no
mechanism for enforcement.
The legislature, in 1967, created the California Advisory Commission
on Marine and Coastal Resources declaring it
to be the policy of the State of California to develop, encourage, and
maintain a comprehensive, coordinated state plan for the orderly,
long-range conservation and development of marine and coastal re-
sources which will ensure their wise multiple use in the total public
interest. 41
Unfortunately, the Commission is exactly what it says--"Advisory." It
has no real powers to ensure "wise multiple use in the total public in-
terest."
42
37 Dr. Norman K. Sanders, Californids Coastline . . . The Shattered Resource,
prepared for Senate Natural Resources Committee hearing (Jan. 1969).
8S Id.
39 County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (1970); County of Santa
Barbara v. Malley, 426 F.2d 171 (1970).
40 CALIF. CONsT. art. XXVII.
41 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8800 (CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1642, p. 3934, § 1).
42 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8815-25.
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The furthest step taken so far by the legislature toward managing
a specific portion of salt-water shoreline has been the creation and ex-
tension43 of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission.44
Fortunately, this commission not only has the power to draw up a plan
5
for the Bay Area, but also has the power to enforce the plan through
issuance or denial of a permit for any proposed project "making any
substantial change"4 6 within the area of the Commission's jurisdiction.
Except for BCDC, the public has no effective means for protecting
its interest in coastal resources. This is true in spite of a recent decision
by the California Supreme Court recognizing the right of public access
to beaches.47 However, even that right may not be compatible with
protection of the resources, i.e., unrestricted public access may be
harmful to the ecology. In any case, no court can solve the access
problem without some legal theory on which to base its decision.
Adequate and well-planned legislation seems to be the appropriate
step for a lasting solution. So far, the legislature has seen fit to enact
only policy statements; the only exception being the creation and ex-
tension of BCDC.48  However, there were several legislative proposals
dealing with these problems introduced during the 1970 Regular Ses-
sion.49
Legislative and Judicial Approach
The basic issue in this dilemma seems to be one of how the state can
solve these problems while taking into account the rights of both pub-
lic and private sectors. It develops into the common legal practice of
balancing the rights of the public against the interests of the private
owners.
The legislature has expressed its concern for the public interest. The
courts can use this expression as a guideline in deciding the balancing is-
sue. 10 It has been further expressed as follows:
43 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66659.
The commission shall continue in existence until such time as the Legislature
provides for the termination of the existence of the commission or for the
transfer of the commissions functions and duties to some other permanent
agency.
44 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-66661.
45 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66603.
4 6 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66604.
47 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29 (1970).
48 See note 44 supra.
49 A.B. 493 and A.B. 2418, 1970 Regular Session (Access bills). S.B. 371,
A.B. 2131, A.B. 730 and A.B. 640, 1970 Regular Session. (Coastline conservation bills).
50 Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43 (1970):
Art. XV, § 2 ... clearly indicates that we should encourage public use of
shoreline areas whenever that can be done consistently with the federal con-
stitution.
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The Legislature finds that the rapid growth and spread of urban
development is encroaching upon or eliminating many open areas
and spaces of varied size and character, including many having
scenic or aesthetic values, which areas and spaces, if preserved and
maintained in their present open state would constitute important
physical, social, aesthetic or economic assets of existing or impend-
ing urban and metropolitan development. 1
This policy, coupled with those expressed earlier,52 apparently favor
state action that would provide some method of control over areas of
natural beauty, including the coastline. The method of control under
study at present concerns the creation of a comprehensive zoning plan
for the entire coastal strip.53
Although the exercise of the police power in the form of zoning re-
strictions may diminish the value or utility of private property in indi-
vidual instances, 54 the very essence of the police power as distinguished
from the power of eminent domain is that the deprivation of some in-
dividual rights in property without compensation cannot prevent the
operation of the police power, once it is shown that its exercise is proper
and that the method of its exercise is reasonable within the meaning of
due process of law. 55
The creation of a comprehensive zoning plan usually involves lengthy
study and hearings before the responsible administrative authority.
Consequently, it is imperative, if the ultimate plan adopted is not to be
largely defeated by activity of nonconforming use during the interim
period, that some preliminary enactment or regulation be adopted to,
maintain the status quo until the details of the regulations can be
worked out and the complete plan finally adopted. 0 Such emergency
enactments and interim regulatory measures are as much a part of a
comprehensive general zoning plan as if embraced in the general zon-
ing law, provided they are duly and regularly passed by a legislative
body in contemplation of a general zoning law and prove to be reason-
ably related to the general plan and the public welfare.
57
There is little question but that the prevention of further development
of the lands and waters of the California coastline during preparation of
a comprehensive plan for this area is a valid exercise of the state's po-
51 CAL. Gov'r CODE § 6951. (CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 1658, § 1, p. 4031).
52 See note 30 supra.
53 A.B. 2131, A.B. 730 and A.B. 640, 1970 Regular Session.
54 Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 83 Sup. Ct. 145 (1962).
55 Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552 (1953).
56 Lima v. Woodruff, 107 Cal. App. 285 (1930).
57 Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Wks., 195 Cal. 477, error dismissed, 273 U.S. 781
(1925).
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lice power and does not require payment of compensation to affected
private interests. It is an established rule of constitutional law that the
police power may be used unless it can be shown to bear no reasonable
relationship to the public health or welfare or is applied arbitrarily. 58
The U.S. Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker"9 stated:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 6
0
Even though Berman v. Parker did not deal directly with zoning, it
has been held to "consider such distinction to be immaterial in consid-
ering the scope of the police power and its exercise to promote the
general welfare.""' California courts early recognized these principles
as applied to changing conditions in a rapidly growing state.62
Later decisions have demonstrated a stronger trend by the courts to
uphold the validity of state acts aimed at improving or preserving lands
for public use. 63  The question of whether the regulation may, in
essence, be a "taking" was well answered in Dept. of Pub. Wks. v.
Curtis:
It is beyond question today that well-recognized property values
may be substantially impaired by certain kinds of governmental
action without payment of compensation.
64
58 B. ScHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PART II, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 227 (1965).
What the Supreme Court said in Berman v. Parker should be a powerful in-
ducement to courts throughout the land to repudiate the notion that the police
power may not be employed to promote aesthetic progress-whether through
zoning or other regulatory measures.
GO Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
60 Id.
61 State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, 223 (1955).
62 Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Wks., 195 Cal. 477 (1925):
... the police power, as such is not confined within the narrow circum-
spection of precedents, resting upon past conditions . . . obviously calling for
revised regulations to promote the health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare of the public . . as a commonwealth develops politically, economqically
and socially, the police power likewise develops . . . to meet the changed and
changing conditions.
See McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879 (1953); Ayres v. City of L.A., 34
Cal. 2d 31 (1949); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515; appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54
Cal. 2d 86 (1960).
63 People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378 (1967); Gion
v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29 (1970); Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29 (1970).
64 People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 383 (1967):
Within judicially declared constitutional minimum standards. . . the legislative
power may be exercised to inflict economic loss where necessary to accom-
plish a legitimate public purpose. Thus, it is established that an uncompen-
sated dedication of land for public use can constitutionally be required by a
local planning body as a condition of giving official approval to private de-
velopment of other property.
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Such "governmental action" could even consist of regulations pro-
tecting the public's interest before approval of any development project
is granted. 65
An analysis of several California cases66 has led to the conclusion
that:
. . . California courts will continue to . . . sustain regulations
even though there are some analogous precedents available to in-
validate them. Courts cannot ignore the consequences of their rul-
ings, and the consequences of unfavorable rulings on regulations
would be substantially detrimental to what might be described as
the long-run public interest in planning to cope with problems
spawned by rapidly increasing urban chaos.67
A workable approach to the enforcement of such governmental regu-
lations involves an obligation of the judiciary to uphold reasonable at-
tempts to protect the public interest. This appears to be the only feasi-
ble solution to the problem of preservation of the coastline or any other
environmental problem.
Proppsed Federal and State Legislation
The primary coastal zone management focus is now on Congress,
where a number of bills are pending.68 Though there are significant
differences, all are cast in the same mold, offering grants to states as in-
centives to develop and implement comprehensive management plans
for coastal areas. The bills do not make any state action mandatory.
States would have the primary responsibility for establishing coastal
management plans. The federal government would have authority to
review plans and implementation procedures to be sure they are effective
and for the public's benefit as a condition for approval of grants. The
federal government would be authorized to make grants to coastal states
for comprehensive coastal zone planning and management, provided a
state program meets a wide range of planning development and environ-
mental protection prerequisites.
These prerequisites include such things as designation of a single
state agency to develop a plan and administer the program, formula-
tion of a plan for balanced coastal land and water use, authority to im-
65 11 A.L.R.2d 537.
The contention that conditions imposed upon approval of a proposed sub-
division plat or map are invalid as constituting a veiled attempt to exercise
the power of eminent domain has, under the facts and circumstances dis-
closed in the particular cases, been consistently rejected.
66 See note 62 supra.
67 Hyman, Regulation Legal Questions, PoWERs, Vol. I (1968).
68 S. 2802, S. 3183, S. 3460, H.R. 14730 & 14731, H.R. 14845, H.R. 15099,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
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plement the plan, power to issue land use or zoning regulations, ability
to acquire lands through condemnation or other means, power to issue
or withhold permits for state, local and private projects, depending on
whether they are consistent with the plan, plus numerous other provi-
sions of lesser importance. Basically, these bills are designed to pro-
mote direct action by the states through federal grants. It is neither a
new nor a novel approach to a solution but at least it will set up guide-
lines to be followed on a national scale.
The California Legislature, in the 1970 Regular Session, initially
undertook the study of several bills which would have created a coastal
zone conservation and development commission. 9 Subsequent to the
introduction of the bills in the California Assembly, the Assembly Na-
tural Resources and Conservation Committee recommended passage of
A.B. 213 1,7 favoring it over two other measures supported by conser-
vationist groups. In spite of this, a conservation group spokesman re-
ported the measure is "better than nothing."
71
Essentially, A.B. 2131, was to be known and cited as the California
Coastal Zone Conservation and Development Act,72 and declared that
the people of California "have a paramount interest in the protection of
California's coastal zone."'73 To implement this polcy, A.B. 2131 would
have required the creation of the California Coastal Zone Conservation
and Development Authority hereafter called the Authority. This group
was to consist of 13 persons to be designated in accordance with the pro-
vision of the Act.74 In addition, there was a provision for the California
Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources 73 to act as a
technical advisory committee to the Authority.
The primary function of the technical advisory committee was to
draft, within 90 days after passage of the enactment, recommended cri-
teria to be followed by local agencies in formulating zone plans or to
govern agencies in the granting of permits for proposed use of the
69 A.B. 2131, A.B. 640, A.B. 730, S.B. 371, 1970 Regular Session.
70 Sacramento Bee, June 24, 1970, at A5, col. 1.
7' Id.
72 A.B. 2131, 1970 Regular Session, proposed Div. 15 CAL. PuB. RES. CODE.
73 Id. Proposed CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 24002.
74 Id. Proposed CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 24041 provided:
There is in the state government a California Coastal Zone Conservation and
Development Authority, consisting of 13 members, each of whom shall have
an equal vote:
(a) The Lieutenant Governor.
(b) The Secretary of the Resources Agency.
(c) The Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency.
(d) The chairman of each of the five boards.
(e) Five public members appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate who shall be residents of California experienced
and knowledgeable in matters of conservation and use of marine and
coastal resources.
75 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8800 et seq.
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coastal zone prior to completion of the final zoning plan. It also
would have had the power to review any such permits granted by local
agencies.
The bill itself designated the areas of emphasis to be covered in the
recommended criteria: increased beach access, beach conservation, wa-
ter quality and resources. Also, certain specified activities were to bc
prohibited such as dredging and filling or any reduction of public
beaches within the zone. The prohibitions were to be in effect only
until adoption of the criteria by the Authority. Thereafter agencies
could grant permits for uses conforming to established criteria.
The development of the over-all state plan called for transmission by
the Authority of adopted criteria to the five zone boards and all affected
local agencies. The five zone boards referred to above were to be
created and each was to have jurisdiction over a designated area of the
coastline as provided in section 24111 of Assembly Bill 2131.70 Each
zone board would have had jurisdiction over all local agencies within
its particular area with regard to any use of the coastal zone. The
boards would also have been responsible for the compilation of a com-
prehensive zone plan for its designated area. Therefore, within 18
months after receipt of criteria each local agency would have been re-
quired to submit its element of the plan to the appropriate zone board
for incorporation into the zone plan. Any portion not conforming to
the criteria would be remanded to the submitting agency. All the zone
boards were to combine the elements into a zone plan within 24 months
from effective date of enactment and submit the plan to the Authority
for approval. Within 30 months from enactment, the Authority was to
have developed a single, comprehensive land use plan for the entire
coastal zone.
The functions of the agencies and zone boards revolved around a per-
mit system for proposed coastal development during compilation of the
state plan. During the interim period between the effective date of this
division and Authority approval of the criteria, certain uses such as
dredging, filling and reduction of public beaches were to be temporarily
prohibited unless a permit was issued and approved by both the local
agency involved and the appropriate zone board. Upon adoption of
criteria by the Authority, however, the interim control referred to above
terminated and the local agencies could have granted permits for con-
forming uses subject to review by the zone boards. The review was to
take place before any such use was effected and the zone boards could
have required any supporting documents or evidence to be forwarded
76 A.B. 2131, 1970 Regular Session, proposed CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 24111.
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to it. The board, within a 30 day period, was to either approve the
use or notify the party or agency that the use failed to conform to the
adopted criteria.
If a board found that the proposed use did not conform to the adopted
criteria then it would have withheld approval and notified the agency
in writing of the particulars in which the proposed use failed to conform.
Whoever proposed the use could then petition the board for approval
of a revised permit and unless the revision was made to conform, the
agency would not grant a permit. This appeared to be the only method
of appeal available to any prospective user of the "coastal zone."
77
Since the state plan was to be developed from the local level on up,
the above permit system would have remained in affect until the adop-
tion of the final state plan. Therefore, the local agency would have
been required to measure any proposed use against its "element"'
78 of
the plan until the element was superseded by the adoption of the zone
plan. While the zone plan was in effect, all uses were to have been
measured against it until it was finally superseded by the state plan.
At this point, the state plan would have been the measuring device
which guided all local agencies in issuing permits. The entire structure
of development of the plan and the overriding permit system more or
less would have resembled a pyramid beginning at the local level and
ending with one complete plan for the state's entire "coastal zone."
Unfortunately, A.B. 2131 had some built-in weaknesses. The pro-
visions would have become inoperative and of no force or effect after
January 1, 1974. One of the powers given to the Authority by A.B.
2131 was to
[S]ue and be sued in all actions and proceedings and in all courts
and tribunals of competent jurisdiction to obtain remedy, including
prohibitory and mandatory injunctions to restrain violations of
the provisions of this division.
79
This meant that there would no longer be a legal entity with standing to
sue for enforcement of the state plan. In other words, there would be a
supposedly enforceable plan on file with no one to see that the plan was
adhered to.
In addition, A.B. 2131 undoubtedly would have suffered from the
inherent weakness of the creation of two many levels of authority. For
example, the development of planning criteria was the function of the
technical advisory committee, the criteria approval was the responsibility
of the Authority and then the implementation of the criteria was the re-
77 Id. Proposed CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 24027.
78 Id. Proposed CAL. PB. RES. CODE § 24029.
79 Id. Proposed CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 24081(d).
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sponsibility of the local agencies. This unduly cumbersome process
supposedly repeated itself again when the local agencies submitted their
element plans to the zone boards for compilation, and then the final
plan was to be approved by the Authority. In theory, this arrangement
was called workable because the local agencies were supposedly bound
by the established criteria in the first place. It may even have been in-
teresting to see if such an arrangement could have completed its pur-
pose within the thirty month time frame the bill called for. But it more
readily brings to mind the old saying that a camel is really a horse de-
signed by a committee.
Prior to its demise at the hands of the California State Senate, A.B.
2131 was passed by the Assembly over two other bills, A.B. 640 and
A.B. 730.80 Both of these latter bills were favored by conservation
groups over A.B. 2131 because of their apparently more strilgent regu-
lations. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to briefly examine the con-
tents of these two bills.
In essence, both bills covered the same basic area of the California
coastline. However, A.B. 640 defined its area as a "coastal zone" ex-
tending one mile inland and three miles seaward from mean high-tide.',
A fairly rigidly defined area. On the other hand, A.B. 730 designated a
"coastal-marine zone" as the land and water from the landward limit of
the sea to the highest elevation of the nearest mountain range and sea-
ward to the outermost limit of the state's jurisdiction. '  However. the
real jurisdiction zeros in on a "primary area", which is that part of the
"coastal-marine zone" lying within one-half mile inland from the sea.,"
Even though both bills called for the creation of a "commission",
A.B. 640 divided the coastal area into five regional commissions while
A.B. 730 created four district boards. Both of these sub-entities were
to be responsible for the issuance of development permits based, how-
ever, on different criteria. A.B. 640 required a permit for any "sub-
stantial change" which was defined as any irreversible modification, con-
struction or excavation totalling in excess of $10,000 dollars.8 A.B.
730's district boards would have required a permit for any "develop-
ment."85 This term was rather loosely defined to include placement of
fill and building of piers; discharge of sewage or any waste liquid or
solid; grading, moving, dredging, mining or extraction of material or any
construction or removal of trees.
80 A.B. 640 and A.B. 730, 1970 Regular Session.
81 A.B. 640, 1970 Regular Session, proposed CAL. PUB. REs. COD § 20103.
82 A.B. 730, 1970 Regular Session, proposed CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 14102.
83 Id. Proposed CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 14105.
s4 A.B. 640, 1970 Regular Session, proposed CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 20105.
85 A.B. 730, 1970 Regular Session, proposed CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 14103.
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As in A.B. 2131, the legislation involved here called for the develop-
ment of a state plan. Both commissions were to be responsible for pre-
paring and adopting a comprehensive and enforceable coastal zone plan
for the balanced long-range conservation and development of the re-
sources of the coastal zone. The key words were "comprehensive" and
"enforceable." The former from a constitutional view point and the lat-
ter to give the commission the necessary power. In A.B. 640, however,
each regional commission was to make a detailed comprehensive and
enforceable plan for its coastal zone. The other bill did not extend such
duties to its district boards but rather kept the responsibility for the plan's
creation with the commission.
A.B. 640 was somewhat similar in its approach to development of the
plan as was the case in A.B. 2131. The regional commissions were re-
sponsible for development of an interim plan within a certain period
of time. Such plan was to be submitted to the state commission for ap-
proval to see that it was drawn up in accordance with the specified cri-
teria. Presumably, the interim plan of A.B. 640 would have acted as a
guide for issuance of permits before the total statewide plan was de-
veloped and put into effect.
The method of enforcing the plan revolved around the permit sys-
tem. In both A.B. 640 and A.B. 730, the initial filing for a permit was
to be done through the regional commissions or district boards. Any
person or government agency wishing to make a "substantial change" or
engage in "development" of the coastal area would be required to file
for a permit. Where the affected city or county also required a permit
for development then such application was to be made to the city coun-
cil or county board of supervisors. After an investigation and a public
hearing of the proposed development, the council or board of supervis-
ors were to file a report with the regional commission or district board.
All of the procedures for obtaining a permit required a certain amount
of time in which the regional commissions or district boards must act.
Within this time frame, they could have either approved or denied
the permit. If the commission or board failed to act within the pre-
scribed period then the permit would automatically have been granted.
The reasoning behind such a provision was obvious, otherwise the
regional commission or district board would have had almost unlimited
power to frustrate any development at all.
Both A.B. 640 and A.B. 730 provided for a method of appeal in case
a permit was denied at the regional or district level. A.B. 640 made
provision for reapplication to the regional commission or a direct appeal
to the state commission. The decision of the state commission, by ma-
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jority vote, on appeal would be final. A.B. 730 granted permission to
appeal to the commission but it also established procedures for declin-
ig to hear appeals that it determined raised no substantial issues of
fact or policy. In such a case, the decision of the district board became
final. Even if the commission failed to act on an appeal within 60
days after filing, the board action became final. A.B. 730 also included
a 90 day statute of limitations for starting any court proceeding to con-
test denial of a permit application.
Each bill contained a provision for a final commission report and
termination of the existence of the commission. At this time, it would
be the legislature's duty to study the effect of the commission and deter-
mine whether it had carried out its primary function. If the results were
affirmative, then the legislature could vote to extend the life of the com-
mission.
It is readily apparent why the above bills were favored by conserva-
tion groups over A.B. 2131. In essence, they were stronger bills calling
for centralization of power on a state-wide level. Consequently, the
bills were opposed by many organizations who stress the local govern-
ment concept over usurpation of such powers by larger governmental
entities. Perhaps A.B. 213.1's own built-in weaknesses were responsi-
ble for its proceeding in the legislative process as far as it ultimately did
before failing. In any case, coastal conservation remains an expressed
policy of the state but the state is without the means of enforcing that
policy.
Conclusion
Little doubt should remain that protection of the values and price-
less natural resources of the coastal zone is the concern of all of the
people of California and that it is a statewide purpose of the highest im-
portance and priority to realize the coordinated planning and use of
the coastal zone as a unitary, finite, precious resource. It is not the
function of the judiciary to initiate such steps nor do local coastal county
governments seem to be equipped or inclined to act in concert to solve
the problem. The legislature, therefore, must be put on notice by the
public itself that it is time to act. Areas of great natural beauty, once
destroyed, cannot be replaced. It is up to the legislature to see that they
remain for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations.
Bertram C. White
